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FIRST LINE DEFENDERS AS SECOND CLASS 
CITIZENS: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING RIGHTS 
FOR TSA EMPLOYEES AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
MAKE GOOD BEDFELLOWS
MARK D. ROTH & JAMISON F. GRELLA*
I. INTRODUCTION
With little pomp and even less circumstance, Transportation Security Agency (TSA) Under-
Secretary Admiral James Loy issued a one-paragraph memorandum on January 8, 2003, declaring 
that Transportation Security Offi cers (TSOs) had no right to have an exclusive bargaining represen-
tative negotiate on their behalf  in the interest of  national security.1  Specifi cally, Under-Secretary Loy 
stated:
By virtue of  the authority vested in the Under Secretary of  Transportation for the Security in 
Section 111(d) of  the Aviation and Transportation Security Act . . . I hereby determine that individu-
als carrying out the security screening function . . . [for the TSA], in light of  their critical national 
security responsibilities, shall not, as a term or condition of  their employment, be entitled to engage 
in collective bargaining or be represented for the purpose of  engaging in such bargaining by any 
*     Mark D. Roth is General Counsel of  the American Federation of  Government Employees (AFGE), American 
Federation of  Labor-Congress of  Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and a member of  the board of  directors of  
the AFL-CIO’s Lawyer’s Coordinating Committee.  B.A., University of  Syracuse; J.D., University of  Toledo College of  
Law; L.L.M. (Labor Law), Georgetown University Law Center.  Jamison F. Grella is a law clerk in the General Counsel’s 
Offi ce, AFGE.  B.F.A., New York University, Tisch School of  the Arts; J.D. Candidate May 2011, American University, 
Washington College of  Law.  Special thanks to Gony F. Goldberg (Assistant General Counsel, AFGE, AFL-CIO. B.A. 
Brandeis University; J.D. George Washington University Law School) for support, consultation, and guidance during the 
writing of  this article.
        While all the authors are employed by the American Federation of  Government Employees (AFGE), a union 
representing 600,000 federal civilian employees, the views in this article are those of  the authors, and not necessarily 
those of  the AFGE or its membership.
1  See generally  Mark D. Roth et al., Job Security and Bargaining Rights of  Federal Government Employees, 8 UDC/DCSL 
L. REV. 153 (2004) (detailing the contentious nature of  labor-management relations during the George W. Bush 
Administration that existed before September 11, 2001,  and led to the passage of  the ATSA).
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representative or organization.2 
However, Loy’s assertion that bargaining rights for TSOs will compromise national security was 
and remains meritless; in fact, quite the opposite is true.  Given the current pitiful state of  employee-
management relations at the TSA, collective bargaining rights will dramatically improve national 
security.  To help elicit this much needed change in the way the TSA does business, the American 
Federation of  Government Employees, American Federation of  Labor – Congress of  Industrial Or-
ganizations (AFGE, AFL-CIO) fi led a petition with the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) 
to grant over 40,000 TSOs the opportunity to elect a certifi ed bargaining representative.3  Unfor-
tunately, since the failed bombing of  Northwest/Delta Airlines Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, 
Senator James “Jim” DeMint (R-SC) has reignited the false idol of  national security angst to attempt 
to slow down the granting of  TSOs collective bargaining rights.4   
This Article will argue that collective bargaining rights for TSOs will be a boon to national 
security interests at the TSA.  Part II of  this Article will place the current lack of  bargaining rights 
for TSA employees in the proper historical and statutory context.5  Part III will demonstrate that, 
given the current statutory scheme, the argument against collective bargaining rights in the interest 
of  national security is a shallow and shameful argument fueled by anti-union political forces capital-
izing on public unease in the post-September 11th era.6  Part IV will argue that granting collective 
bargaining rights to TSOs will greatly benefi t the TSA’s mission of  increasing aviation security.7  Part 
V will conclude that any attempts to prevent TSOs from obtaining a collective bargaining represen-
tative is contrary to the interests of  national security and the mission of  the TSA to secure American 
commercial airspace.8
II.  CREATION AND HISTORY OF THE TSA
In 2001, Congress called for the federalization of  airport security screeners in the interest of  na-
tional security and the creation of  the Transportation Security Authority to fulfi ll this mission.9  As a 
condition of  signing the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), the Bush Administration 
2  Am. Fed’n. of  Gov’t Employees AFL-CIO, 59 F.L.R.A. 423, at 2 (2003) (quoting Admiral Loy’s January 8, 2003 
memorandum regarding the collective bargaining rights of  TSA security screeners).
3  See Press Release, Am. Fed’n of  Gov’t Employees, AFGE: It’s Time For An Election at TSA, Feb. 22, 2010, http://
www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaseID=1110 (detailing the culmination of  eight years of  effort 
by AFGE).
4  See Brett Snyder, TSA’s Poor Handling of  Northwest 253 Shows Need for Leadership, BNET.COM, Dec. 29, 2009, http://
industry.bnet.com/travel/10004490/tsas-poor-handling-of-northwest-253-shows-need-for-leadership (arguing that 
DeMint’s anti-union agenda is unacceptable given the dire need for leadership at the TSA).
5  See infra Part II (detailing the statutory context in which Loy declared that TSOs could not have bargaining rights).
6  See infra Part III (demonstrating that FSLMRS already assures appropriate safeguards for national security without 
prohibiting TSOs from collectively bargaining).
7  See infra Part IV (arguing that a collective bargaining agreement in place for TSOs will enable the TSA to better fulfi ll 
its mission).
8  See infra Part V (concluding that opponents of  collective bargaining rights for TSOs are using national security to 
further an unrelated, anti-union agenda).
9  Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001) (codifi ed as amended in the 
scattered sections of  49 U.S.C.).
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required Congress to create “fl exibility” in human relations management.10  In terms of  administrat-
ing this mission, the TSA was mandated by statute to comply with the Federal Aviation Authority’s 
(FAA) system of  personnel management.11  However, in a statutory note to the ATSA in § 111(d), 
the TSA Administrator is empowered to, “[n]ot withstanding any other provision of  law . . . employ, 
appoint, discipline, terminate, and fi x the compensation, terms, and conditions of  employment of  
Federal service for airport screeners and establish levels of  compensation and other benefi ts for 
individuals so employed.”12
Relying upon § 111(d), TSA Administrator Admiral Loy declared the TSOs exempt from virtu-
ally all rights bestowed to federal employees by virtue of  the Federal Service Labor Management 
Relations Statute (FSLMRS) in the name of  national security.13  Thus, the Administrator was given 
unlimited discretion over the personnel management of  the security-screening workforce.14  Pur-
suant to the FSLMRS, the FLRA is afforded sole jurisdiction for determining the composition of  
appropriate bargaining units for federal agencies.15  In 2003, the FLRA upheld Admiral Loy’s Janu-
ary 8, 2003, memorandum that stated TSOs were precluded from bargaining collectively through an 
exclusive representative in the interest of  national security.16 Then-member Carol Waller Pope (now 
the current Chairperson of  the FLRA) offered a scathing dissent to the majority’s conclusion, stating 
that: 
The majority does not explain why it interprets [§ 111(d)] to permit the [TSA] head to  elimi-
nate employees’ right to organize under the [ATSA].  Moreover, even a casual reading of  [§ 111(d)] 
demonstrates that it relates to the determinations of  employee working conditions hiring, appoint-
ment, discipline, and compensation – not a determination whether the employees are permitted to 
organize under the [ATSA].  Although that provision may grant [TSA] discretion over the subjects 
contained in it, it does not grant discretion to add subjects that Congress left out.  That is what the 
majority does here.17 
Though TSOs have been barred from having a collective bargaining representative, TSOs are 
10  See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 44935 (2006) (granting the TSA Administrator expansive powers over the TSA workforce).  
See also, Alex C. Hallet, An Argument for the Denial of  Collective-Bargaining Rights of  Federal Airport Security Screeners, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 834, 842 (2004) (concluding that inconsistent language regarding collective bargaining rights under § 
44935 retained in the fi nal version of  the ATSA adds credence to the broad management rights provisions).
11  See Roth, et al., supra note 2, at 170–71 (describing how inclusion of  this language at 49 U.S.C. § 114(n) explicitly 
but indirectly incorporates collective bargaining rights from the FSLRMS into the ATSA).
12  § 111(d) (codifi ed as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 44935 Note (2006)).
13  See Am. Fed’n. of  Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, 59 F.L.R.A. 423, at 2 (2003) (quoting Admiral Loy’s January 8, 2003 
memorandum).
14 See, e.g., Dep’t of  Homeland Sec. Border and Transp. Directorate Transp. Sec. Agency, 59 F.L.R.A. 423 (demonstrating that 
both courts and administrative agencies have understood §114(n) to apply to the non-screener workforce of  the TSA 
and the statutory note to apply to the majority of  the TSA workers: TSOs))
15  See  Am. Fed’n. of  Gov’t Employees AFL-CIO v. Loy, 281 F. Supp. 2d 59, 63, n.9 (D.D.C. 2003), aff ’d, Am. Fed’n. 
of  Gov’t Employees v. Loy, 367 F.3d 932 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (ruling that in light of  5 U.S.C. § 7111(b)(1)(a) grants the 
FLRA the exclusive jurisdiction to determine bargaining in the federal sector).
16  See Am. Fed’n. of  Gov’t Employees, AFL-CIO, 59 F.L.R.A. at 12–13 (noting that only the TSA Administrator may 
decide whether to afford TSOs collective bargaining rights).
17  Id. at 15.
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permitted to join a union under the First Amendment even if  that union cannot bargain collectively 
on their behalf.18  Unions such as AFGE, though barred from serving as the collective bargain-
ing representative for TSOs, have engaged in providing legal aid, representation, and informational 
clinics to TSOs who have joined.19  Though AFGE has made important gains in improving the low 
morale and high attrition among the TSOs, without a collective bargaining agreement there is a limit 
to how much AFGE can do.20
During his presidential campaign in 2008, President Barak Obama, in a letter to AFGE National 
President John Gage, promised that if  elected he would reverse the Bush Administration’s posi-
tion withholding collective bargaining rights from TSA employees and would “work to ensure that 
TSOs have collective bargaining rights and a voice at work to address issues that arise locally and 
nationally.”21  President Obama found a nominee with the credentials and drive to head the TSA; 
Erroll Southers, a former FBI agent and homeland security specialist, managed to make it through 
two Senate committees with bipartisan support for his appointment.22  However, in December 2009, 
Senator DeMint threatened to fi libuster Southers’ appointment due in part to DeMint’s belief  that 
Southers would provide bargaining rights for TSOs.23  Ultimately, Southers withdrew his nomina-
tion thereby leaving the TSA without an Administrator.24  Shortly thereafter, on February 22, 2010, 
AFGE fi led a petition for an election of  a certifi ed collective bargaining representative with the 
FLRA for the more than 40,000 TSOs employed by the TSA.25  
However, DeMint’s initial line-in-the-sand over the issue of  collective bargaining rights has con-
tinued to cast a pall over the confi rmation of  a new TSA Administrator and gather supporters.  Sen-
ator Kay Bailey Hutchinson (R-TX) echoed DeMint’s misplaced concerns during the abortive nomi-
nation process of  Robert Harding in March 2010.26  Finally, on June 25, 2010, President Obama 
18  See Am. Fed’n. of  Gov’t Employees, Local 1 v. Stone, 502 F.3d 1027, 1033–34 (9th Cir. 2007) (ruling that the TSA 
could not interfere with AFGE’s attempts to solicit membership).
19  See id. at 1033–34 (noting that even if  AFGE had been barred from serving as the collective bargaining 
representative, the union may still represent TSOs in other matters).
20  See Maria L. Ontiveros, Labor Union Coalition Challenges To Governmental Action:  Defending the Civil Rights of  Low-Wage 
Workers, 1 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 145-146 (2009) (concluding that the open-source form of  union representation that 
AFGE is currently providing to TSOs is requisite to long term social change for low wage workers).
21  Letter from Barack Obama, U.S. Senator, to John Gage, National President, AFGE (on fi le with author), available 
at http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Barack_Obama%27s_Letter_to_John_Gage_regarding_the_Transportation_Security_
Administration (last modifi ed Oct. 20, 2008).
22  See Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Ed O’Keefe, Obama’s embattled TSA pick withdraws as opposition mounts; Errors in Southers’s 
testimony prompted skepticism from GOP, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2010, at A4 (reporting that DeMint’s stalling tactics had caused 
other Senators to question Southers’ competence, leading to his withdrawal).
23  Id.
24  See id. (noting that the TSA has been without leaderless since President Obama came into power).
25  See Sam Hananel, Union Moves to Represent Airport Screeners, ABCNEWS.COM, Feb. 22, 2010, http://abcnews.go.com/
Business/wireStory?id=9910830 (commenting that a union ordinarily waits until workers have bargaining rights before 
seeking to represent them).
26  See Joe Davidson, TSA Pick to Face Questions About Collective-Bargaining Rights During Hearing, WASHINGTON POST (June 
8, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/07/AR2010060704514.html.
121NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 1, No. 1
found a new Administrator for the TSA, John Pistole, whom the Senate unanimously confi rmed.27  
During his confi rmation hearings, Pistole—probably with opponents like DeMint and Hutchinson in 
mind—declined to take a stand on the issue of  collective bargaining rights for TSOs.28  The decision 
may ultimately be out of  Administrator Pistole’s hands now that the FLRA has granted a review of  
AFGE’s February 2010 petition for election.29 
III.  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR TSOS DOES NOT THREATEN NATIONAL SECURITY
Recently, the most vehement, if  not sole, opposition to collective bargaining rights at the TSA 
is from Senator DeMint.30  Senator DeMint has framed the argument that the interests of  national 
security are incompatible with the collective bargaining rights of  the 40,000 TSOs.31  This argument 
fails upon closer examination because there is no rational relation, historically or otherwise, between 
the right to bargain collectively and the right of  the American people to know that their air-travel is 
secure.  The statutory scheme of  the FSLMRS, the presence of  collective bargaining rights in other 
agencies that support national security, and the performance of  many unionized federal workers dur-
ing national emergencies demonstrate that there currently is a proper balance in place between the 
TSA’s (or DHS’s or DOD’s or DOJ’s) ability to perform its statutorily assigned duties and the right 
of  the rank-and-fi le security screeners to exercise the federal sector bargaining rights enumerated in 
the FSLMRS.
The opposition’s central argument against collective bargaining rights for TSOs is that bargain-
ing rights and an agreement would force the TSA to consult and negotiate with the union over every 
issue that might arise, thus limiting its ability to adapt to the security needs of  the nation’s airports.32  
In essence, this argument is that the presence of  an exclusive bargaining representative would tie 
the TSA’s hands in its day-to-day activities.  However, this argument incorrectly ignores the reality 
of  the collective bargaining paradigm in the federal sector pursuant to granting signifi cant manage-
ment rights in the FSLMRS.33  Essentially, any bargaining with the federal government over areas 
listed within § 7106 is limited to effects rather than decision bargaining.34  By way of  illustration, a 
27  See Joe Davidson, John Pistole Becomes TSA Administrator; Unions to Seek Collective-Bargaining, WASHINGTON POST (June 
26, 2010), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/25/AR2010062504490.html.
28  See id.  
29  See Press Release, Am. Fed’n of  Gov’t Employees, FLRA Agrees With AFGE That Review is Necessary in TSA 
Petition, July 30, 2010, available at http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaseID=1195.
30  See Margaret Talev, Who’s Running the TSA?  No one, thanks to Sen. Jim DeMint, MCCLATCHY NEWSPAPERS, DEC. 28, 
2009, http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2009/12/28/81356/whos-running-the-tsa-no-one-thanks.html (highlighting 
Senator DeMint’s lead role in holding back President Obama’s nomination for TSA administrator).
31  Id. (stating that unionizing the TSA would place the interests of  organized labor above the interests of  American 
travelers).
32  Id. (arguing that collective bargaining would impair the fl exibility the TSA has to make real-time decisions to 
prevent attempted attacks).
33  See 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (2006) (delineating numerous areas in which management retains the right to set the terms and 
conditions of  employment).
34  See § 7106(a)(2)(D) (stating that nothing in § 7106 shall affect the authority or ability of  the TSA “to take whatever 
actions” to ensure that the agency continues functioning properly during an emergency).
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bargaining representative could negotiate over the effect of  an employee’s temporary transfer or fi le 
a grievance after the fact, but could not challenge the underlying decision at the time the temporary 
transfer is made.35  Therefore, collective bargaining would help the TSA in its day-to-day activities 
because it would put screeners—acutely aware of  what needs to happen and what needs to happen 
well on a day-to-day level—at the table to strengthen the negotiable procedures and practices, or the 
impact and implementation of  management rights, in a way that is not present today.  Furthermore, 
it would give TSOs a neutral arbitrator to challenge the TSA when it fails to follow its own rules on 
a day-to-day basis.  The claim that collective bargaining rights would give unions the power “to veto 
or delay future security improvements at our airports”36 is woefully ignorant of  the statutory scheme 
created by the FSLMRS to govern labor relations between the federal government, unions, and em-
ployees.  
One item that is expressly removed from any bargaining table with the TSA is any bargaining 
over the decision to implement security procedures or practices.  All federal agencies are empow-
ered to suspend collective bargaining agreements in the presence of  a national emergency under § 
7106(a)(2)(D) which states that “nothing . . . shall affect the authority of  any management offi cial 
of  any agency . . . to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the agency mission during 
emergencies.”37  Interestingly, during and after the attacks of  September 11, 2001, no federal agency 
made any effort to suspend any collective bargaining agreement in place with the federal govern-
ment—including the Department of  Defense.   Finally, there is an absolute prohibition on labor 
strikes against the federal government as an employer.38  In fact, many of  the fi rst responders to the 
September 11th attacks were union members—fi refi ghters, police offi cers, FEMA personnel, and 
construction workers—who performed their jobs fi rst without consulting either a union steward 
or a collective bargaining agreement.39  Considered in the appropriate statutory context, this raises 
the troubling questions about what, if  any, negative effect on national security negotiating meal and 
break time provisions in a collective bargaining agreement could have on national security.  The an-
swer appears to be that Senator DeMint and others are using national security as a straw dog simply 
to push forward an anti-union agenda at the expense of  leaving the TSA without an Administrator.  
Thus the Agency tasked with implementing policies essential for aviation security has been prevent-
ed from fi lling its top leadership position so essential to its mission functioning.
Several other federal agencies, including some other Department of  Homeland Security compo-
35  See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union, 39 FLRA 27, 51 (1991) (noting that § 7106(a)(2)(A) gives management 
the right to decide which employee will be assigned to a particular position). 
36  See Talev, supra note 27 (highlighting Senator DeMint’s insistence that the Obama Administration rethink their 
support for the unionization of  TSOs).
37  § 7106(a)(2)(D).
38  See § 7116(b)(7) (making the calling of  or participation in a strike or stoppage of  work an unfair labor practice 
against the federal government); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44935(i) (2006) (reiterating the no-strike prohibition from the 
FSLMRS into the ATSA).
39  See Charles A. Hobbie, The U.S. Government’s Attacks on the Collective Bargaining Rights of  Federal Employees, UNIONBLOG.
COM, May 25, 2004, http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=UnionBlog&FuseAction=View&BlogID=47&Type=U 
(asserting that the right of  government employees to be represented by a union and engage in collective bargaining has 
never been proven to be a threat of  any kind to national security).
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nents, like the TSA, currently have collective bargaining agreements in place.  Additionally, the De-
partment of  Defense, the Bureau of  Prisons, and the Civilian Branch of  the Coast Guard have had 
collective bargaining rights since the 1960’s and continue to have collective bargaining agreements in 
place with their employees.  Under the statutory provisions of  the FSLMRS, only the Federal Bureau 
of  Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Secret Service have been exempted from 
collective bargaining on grounds of  national security.40  
IV.  COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FOR TSOS WOULD, IF ANYTHING, ENHANCE NATIONAL SECURITY
In almost seventy years of  history since the passage of  the National Labor Relations Act 
(NLRA), private sector, statutorily-protected collective bargaining rights have never been found 
incompatible with national security.41  In Firstline Transportation Security, the National Labor Relations 
Board (NLRB) asserted jurisdiction over the privatized security screeners at Kansas City Internation-
al Airport.42  The NLRB noted that collective bargaining rights and national security are not mutually 
exclusive ends; “[u]nionism and collective bargaining are capable of  adjustments to accommodate 
the special functions of  security screeners, and the regulations set forth in the ATSA already limit 
the collective bargaining rights of  security screeners.”43  Though the NLRB did not discuss the mer-
its of  Admiral Loy’s memorandum withholding collective bargaining rights for federally employed 
screeners, the NLRB refused to extend Loy’s rationale to their private-sector counterparts on the 
grounds of  national security.44  In doing so, the NLRB surveyed almost seventy years of  precedent 
and found that it had never once denied the protections of  the NLRA to employees on grounds 
of  national security.45  The NLRB also indicated that, in its expert opinion, it did not see collective 
40  See 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(6) (2006) (“A [collective bargaining] unit shall not be determined to be appropriate under 
this section solely on the basis of  the extent to which employees in the proposed unit have organized, nor shall a unit be 
determined to be appropriate if  it includes . . . any employee engaged in intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, 
or security work which directly affects national security); see also § 7103(a)(3) (exempting several agencies from the 
provisions of  the FSLMRS).
41  See Firstline Transp. Sec., 347 N.L.R.B. 447, 448 (2006) [hereinafter Firstline].  Though promulgated to enhance 
national security and secure American commercial aviation, the ATSA left fi ve airports with private screeners as part of  
a pilot program and, beginning in November 19, 2004, gave additional airports the ability to opt-out of  using federal 
screeners by allowing any airport nationwide to contract with a private screening company.  Id.  Currently, twelve 
additional airports plus the original fi ve, including San Francisco International Airport, which is unionized under the 
NLRA by Service Employees International Union (SEIU), use privatized security screeners.  See TSA Frequently Asked 
Questions – Program: Screening Partnership Program, http://www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/optout/spp_faqs.shtm (last 
visited Apr. 5, 2010) (describing employee benefi ts and other features of  the Screening Partnership Program); see also 49 
U.S.C. § 44920 (2006) (describing the security screening opt-out provision of  ATSA).
42  Firstline, 347 N.L.R.B. at 456.
43  Id. (fi nding that, since other airport/airline personnel, like pilots and fl ight attendants, who have critical security 
responsibilities have the right to collectively bargain under the Railway Labor Act, any argument about the potential 
detrimental effects of  unionization is speculative).
44  Id. at 457 (noting that it would take Congressional action for such a policy to be adopted for private sector security 
screeners).
45  Id. at 454–56 (establishing that the NLRB has not asserted national security or defense as a reason to deny 
employees their Section 7 rights to organize and bargain collectively).
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bargaining and national security as incompatible.46  
The greatest advantage collective bargaining poses for national security is as a curative measure 
for many of  the employee issues that plague the TSA and distract its personnel and resources from 
implementing policies to enhance aviation security.  Currently, the TSA has the lowest employee mo-
rale, substantially higher per capita incidences of  EEOC complaints, and one of  the highest attrition 
rates of  employees in the entire federal sector.47  As Senator John McCain noted in 2001, one of  the 
major problems with airport security that led to the September 11th attacks was high airport security 
screener attrition.48  Nine years later, the problem still exists.  A strong union presence with collective 
bargaining rights will curb TSO attrition rates so that the TSOs serving as the fi rst-line of  defense 
for American commercial aviation have years of  experience, rather than months.
A collective bargaining agreement between TSOs and the TSA will produce a static and predict-
able system for employees to interact with their supervisors and with the agency as a whole, includ-
ing requesting leave-time and fairer work schedules that can be used to curb TSO attrition.  As 
stated, the TSA currently enjoys higher than average employee attrition when compared with the rest 
of  the federal sector.  In 2007, the TSA reported a voluntary attrition rate of  17.4%, a number that 
is almost the double the average overall federal government rate of  9.7%.49  Of  the 51,129 active 
TSOs in 2007, 36% had been employed for less than two years.50  With a collective bargaining agree-
ment in place, TSOs will be free to focus entirely on performing their security screening duties while 
knowing that their union has arranged for other concerns of  their employment.  Additionally, this 
will give the TSA the opportunity to create a predictable system to retain TSOs through a neutral 
arbitration of  TSO grievances.51
In investigating this high attrition rate, TSA Inspector General Richard L. Skinner reported in 
May 2008 that TSOs suffer from unsatisfactorily low employee morale.  Amongst the reasons listed 
by TSOs for having low moral were:  
• Inconsistent interpretation and implementation of  TSA policies and procedures, such as 
operating procedures, leave policies, and overtime requirements
• Concerns with local management, such as lack of  trust, fear of  retaliation, authoritarian 
46  Id. at 456 (explaining that union membership and collective bargaining are capable of  being molded to fi t the 
special responsibilities of  the TSOs while being faithful to national security interests).
47  See Michael Hampton, Low Morale at TSA leads to Distraction, Attrition, HOMELANDSTUPIDITY.US, Jul. 1, 2008, http://
www.homelandstupidity.us/2008/07/01/low-morale-at-tsa-leads-to-distraction-attrition/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2010).
48  See 147 Cong. Rec. S10,434 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 2001) (statement of  Sen. McCain) (noting that the average attrition at 
major airports was 125% with some airports experiencing rates as high as 400%, mainly because screeners could “make 
more money . . . working at a concession at the same airport . . . and . . . [were] ill-trained”).
49  TSA:  The Facts of  TSO Attrition, http://www.tsa.gov/approach/people/attrition.shtm (last visited Apr 5, 2010) 
(fi nding that the attrition rate was higher with the TSA due to the nature of  the agency, the mental and physical demands 
of  the work, the large amount of  part-time workers employed by the agency, and the relative youth and inexperience of  
the labor force).
50  Id. (noting that the average tenure of  an active TSO was 3.5 years).
51  See generally Memorandum from the Offi ce of  Human Capital, Transp. Sec. Admin., TSA Management Directive 
No. 1100.77-2, Grievance Procedures (Apr. 5, 2006) (on fi le with author) (excluding 23 matters from the internal TSA 
grievance procedure for TSOs).
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management style, mistreatment, and disrespect
• Poor communications and information sharing
• Insuffi cient time to complete all work-related responsibilities, such as training, collateral du-
ties, and Performance Accountability and Standards System documentation
• Favoritism demonstrated through preferential scheduling and unfair promotion practices
• Insuffi cient staffi ng at passenger checkpoints.52 
As a result of  low morale amongst TSOs, the TSA continues to suffer from a signifi cantly higher 
than average incidence of  complaints with the EEOC.53  In 2009, the EEOC heavily admonished 
the TSA for not understanding even the most basic tenets of  the ADA and granted $150,000 in 
damages to a TSO and over $40,000 in attorneys’ fees to AFGE (which provided legal representa-
tion to the discriminated TSO).54  Interestingly, almost all of  the concerns that TSOs raised in In-
spector General Skinner’s 2008 report could be addressed through the collective bargaining process 
between a certifi ed exclusive representative and the TSA.  Ultimately, given the FSLMRS’s statutory 
protections for national security and the TSA’s inability to stem the low morale and attrition amongst 
its security screeners, collective bargaining may be the answer that the beleaguered TSA needs to 
continue its mission for the good of  the American people.
V.  Conclusion  
Ultimately, the fate of  collective bargaining rights for TSOs remains uncertain until TSA Admin-
istrator Pistole, the DHS Secretary, the FLRA, or an act of  Congress affi rmatively grants our fi rst 
line of  defense these rights.  On August 4, 2010, President Obama declared to the AFL-CIO’s Ex-
ecutive Counsel that the “business community sees labor as the problem.”55  However, the Obama 
Administration should hold itself, as employer, to the same standard it wants to hold the private sec-
tor.  For the sake of  national security, it is long past time for President Obama to keep the promises 
he made to TSOs almost two years ago and grant them the collective bargaining rights necessary for 
the TSA to successfully complete its mission.
52  Memorandum from Richard L. Skinner, Inspector General, Dep’t of  Homeland Sec., Transportation Security 
Administration’s Efforts to Proactively Address Employee Concerns, at 3 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter Skinner] (on fi le 
with author). 
53  See id. at 2 (describing that TSOs have used the EEOC has their venue to protest discrimination).
54  See Press Release, Am. Fed’n of  Gov’t Employees, AFGE Wins Unprecedented Damages Award in EEO Case Against 
TSA (Apr. 17, 2009), available at http://www.afge.org/Index.cfm?Page=PressReleases&PressReleaseID=985 (describing 
a complaint in which the TSA discriminated against a TSA employee based on his disability when the agency removed 
him from his position).
55  Fruits of  His Labor, POLITCO (Aug. 4, 2010), available at http://www.politico.com/politico44/perm/0810/obama_
addresses_afl cio_e3c14028-5019-47fa-9098-899353b21017.html.
